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# Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0055

S E C R E T SALT TWO GENEVA 0055

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDSI
TAGS: PARM
SUBJ: HIGHLIGHTS: POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS, FEBRUARY 26, 1975
(SALT TWO-535)

1. MIRV VERIFICATION. TRUSOV (TO EARLE, A-728) SAID THE US SIDE'S QUESTIONS ON HOW TO VERIFY SINGLE RV AND MIRV MODES OF THE SAME ICBM CLASS MAY BE VALID, BUT HE DID NOT THINK WE HAD PRESENTED A VALID SOLUTION. HE SAID THE MAIN PROBLEM WAS THAT EACH SIDE HAD A DIFFERENT APPROACH IN ASSESSING ITS CAPABILITY OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM). HE SAID THE US SIDE WAS NOT PROPERLY EVALUATING ITS CURRENT AND FUTURE NTM CAPABILITY. AS FAR AS THE SOVIET SIDE WAS CONCERNED, BOTH SIDES HAVE THE MEANS TO VERIFY ADEQUATELY ALL THE PROVISIONS OF A NEW AGREEMENT. TUSOV SAID US SIDE TRIED TO ATTACH COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND ABM TREATY IN ORDER TO ENHANCE VERIFICATION, BUT EVENTUALLY WERE CONVINCED THAT THESE WERE NOT NECESSARY--AND THE SAME WAS TRUE TODAY.

2. TRUSOV LATER SAID THAT THE US SIDE'S SOLUTIONS WERE "UNACCEPTABLE" AND ONCE AGAIN UNDERSCORED THAT CURRENT NTM WERE ADEQUATE TO VERIFY ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREE-
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MENT. HE AGREED THAT THIS AGREEMENT WOULD BE MORE COMPLEX

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THAN THE IA OR ABM TREATY, BUT OUR ABILITIES AND NTM CAPA-
BILITIES ARE INCREASING AND VERIFICATION SHOULD NOT PRESENT
A GREAT PROBLEM. TRUSOV SAID HE DID NOT MEAN TO SAY THAT IT
WOULD BE AN EASY TASK--BUT THAT IT COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED
WITHOUT ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS. HE ADDED THAT IF ONE SIDE
TESTED A MISSILE IN BOTH SINGLE AND MIRV MODES, THEN THE OTHER
SIDE SHOULD ASSUME THAT THE FIRST SIDE INTENDED TO DEPLOY BOTH
VERSIONS. THE US PROPOSAL TO COUNT ALL THESE AS MIRV WOULD BE
AN ATTEMPT TO STRUCTURE THE SOVIET FORCE AND CONTRARY TO THE
FREEDOM-TO-MIX PROVISION.

3. AS MEETING WAS BREAKING UP, EARLY ASKED TRUSOV TOEXPLAIN
THE NEXT TIME THEY MET HOW, IF HE WERE IN EARLE'S POSITION,
HE COULD VERIFY THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE SINGLE AND MIRVED VERSION
OF THE SS-18. TRUSOV SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO CONTINUE THE
DISCUSSION AFTER THE NEXT MEETING.

4. KARPOV (AND SMOLIN TO KLOSSON, A-729) SAID THE SOVIET SIDE
WAS COMPLETELY SATISFIED THAT IT WOULD BE ABLE TO VERIFY
ADEQUATELY AMERICAN DEPLOYMENTS THROUGH NTM AS SET FORTH IN THE
SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD NO PROBLEM; THE
PROBLEM WAS AN AMERICAN ONE. THE US DELEGATION, THEREFORE,
SHOULD NOW COME UP WITH SOME NEW ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS IT
HAD SET FORTH.

5. KLOSSON SAID IT WAS DISAPPOINTING THAT THE SOVIET SIDE DID
NOT RECOGNIZE THAT THE PROBLEM WAS A MUTUAL ONE, THAT IT REQUIRED
MUTUAL EFFORTS TO RESOLVE IT, AND THAT IT WAS IN THE INTEREST
OF BOTH SIDES TO ASSURE THAT THEIR RESPECTIVE DEPLOYMENTS COULD
BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIED. KARPOV SAID HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT THE
US GOVERNMENT, WITH SO MANY SKILLED SPECIALISTS, WOULD BE ABLE
IN TIME TO VERIFY SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS. KLOSSON SAID THE PROBLEM
WAS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FOR THE TWO SIDES BECASUE THE SOVIET
UNION WAS IN THE PROCESS OF DEPLOYING OR PREPARING TO DEPLOY
FOUR NEW ICBM SYSTEMS, WHEREAS THE AMERICAN SYSTEMS HAD BEEN
ALREADY DEPLOYED OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS. KARPOV SAID THE US
WOULD HAVE TWO YEARS TO GAIN EXPERIENCE IN VERIFICATION OF THE
NEW SOVIET SYSTEMS BEFORE THE NEW AGREEMENT WENT INTO EFFECT.

6. SMOLIN ASKED WHAT AMBASSADOR JOHNSON MEANT IN HIS STATEMENT
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TODAY REGARDING THE NEED
FOR VERIFIABILITY DURING THE LIFE OF THE AGREEMENT. KLOSSON
REPLIED THAT, WHILE HE WAS NOT SURE THAT SMOLIN WAS CORRECTLY
QUOTING THE AMBASSADOR, HE BELIEVED THAT BOT SIDES WOULD WANT
TO BE IN A POSITION TO ASSURE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION THROUGHOUT
THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT. SMOLIN ASKED WHETHER THE
US WAS MOVE CONCERNED ABOUT THE EARLY YEARS OF THE AGREEMENT OR
THE FINAL YEARS. KLOSSON SAID HE COULD NOT SEE ANY GROUNDS FOR

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SUCH A DISTINCTION IN TERMS OF TIME. THE US WOULD BE SENSITIVE TO THE QUESTION OF VERIFICATION THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD. SMOLIN SAID THAT ONCE THE US SPECIALISTS HAD ACQUIRED THE EXPERIENCE NECESSARY TO VERIFY NEW SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS IN THE 1970'S, WOULD NOT THAT SOLVE THE PROBLEM. KLOSSON SAID THAT THE POSSIBILITY COULD NOT BE RULED OUT THAT THE LATTER HALF OF THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT, THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT CONSIDER DEPLOYING A NEW GENERATION OF ICMB'S, TO SAY NOTHING OF MIRVED SLRM'S

7. KARPOV BROKE IN TO REITERATE THAT IT WAS UP TO THE US DELEGATION TO OFFER ANOTHER SET OF ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS THAT IT HAD POSED. HE SAID THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD OFFER NO ANSWERS BECAUSE IT WAS SATISFIED THAT IT COULD CONDUCT ADEQUATE VERIFICATION WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIONS OR DEFINITIONS.

8. SHCHUKIN (TO ROWNY, A-730) SAID THAT THE MIRV VERIFICATION ISSUE HAD BEEN JOINED; HOWEVER, PURSUING THE ANSWERS WHICH THE US HAD GIVEN TO ITS OWN QUESTIONS WOULD LEAD THE SOVIETS INTO PATHS THEY COULD NOT FOLLOW. HE SAID THAT IF OUR "ALL-OR-NOTHING" COUNTING RULE WERE FOLLOWED, WE WOULD WIND UP COUNTING 2000 OF THE SOVIET SYSTEMS AS MIRVED MISSILES. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD NO INTENTION OF VIOLATING THE 1320 NUMBER, AND HE HOPED WE COULD CONVINCE OUR PEOPLE THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, WITHOUT FURTHER COMPLEXITIES, WERE SUFFICIENT.

9. SHCHUKIN SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD NO VERIFICATION PROBLEM WITH OUR MIRV'S AND THAT ANY MIRV VERIFICATION PROBLEM THAT MIGHT EXIST WAS ONE THE US WAS CONJURING UP. SINCE WE HAD IN THE IA RESOLVED THE PROBLEM OF COUNTING MISSILES BY OBSERVING LAUNCHERS, HE FELT AN EXTENSION OF THESE METHODS WOULD SUFFICE FOR THE NEW AGREEMENT. IN TIME, HE ADDED, BU USING ALL THE INDICATORS AVAILABLE

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THROUGH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, INCLUDING THOSE OTHER THAN PHOTOGRAPHY,WE COULD BE CERTAIN THEY HAD NOT VIOLATED THE 1320 NUMBER. IF THERE WERE ANY DOUBT, WE COULD RAISE IT AS AN AMBIGUITY IN THE SCC.

10. LATER IN THE CONVERSATION, SHCHUKIN SAID THAT INSISTING ON MORE COMPLEXITIES WOULD ONLY MAKE PROBLEMS FOR HIS PEOPLE BACK HOME AND THAT THEY WERE NOT DISPOSED TO DO OTHER THAN RELY ON NTM. THE SAME APPLIED TO ANY DEFINITIONS RELATING TO HEAVY MISSILES. HE ADDED THE SOVIET SIDE HAD NOT VIOLATED THE IA SINCE THEY HAD NOT INCREASED SILO DIMENSIONS BY GREATER THAN 15 PERCENT IN ANY ONE DIRECTION. THEREFORE, ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS WERE UNNECESSARY. ROWNY TOLD SHCHUKIN THAT WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT FOR THE IA WAS NOT ADEQUATE FOR A MORE PERMANENT AGREEMENT. FURTHER, THE THROW-WEIGHT F THEIR

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MISSLIES HAD INCREASED DRAMATICALLY, THUS DRIVING TOE US
TOWARD WANTING MORE PRECISE DEFINITIONS IN THE NEW AGREEMENT.
SHCHUKIN RESPONDED WITH A SMILE THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT WOULD
NOT LAST IN PERPETUITY BUT WOULD ONLY COVER AN 8-YEAR PERIOD.

11. ASM'S. SHCHUKIN (TO ROWNY, A-730) SAID HE WOULD APPRECIATE
THE MILITARY RATIONALE FOR EXCLUDING FROM THE AGGREGATE
AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES OF MORE THAN 600 KM. RANGE.
ROWNY TOLD HIM THE US CONSIDERED SUCH CRUISE MISSILES AS
NECESSARY FOR PENETRATION OF AIR DEFENSES AND POINTED OUT
THAT PENETRATION AIDS REDUCE THE NUMBER OF WEAPONS AN AIRCRAFT
COULD CARRY FOR ITS PRIMARY MISSION. SHCHUKIN ASKED WHAT
WOULD PREVENT THE US FROM EMPLLYING A "ROLLER COASTER" HYBRID
OF A CRUISE AND BALLISTIC MISSILE WHICH WOULD COME IN UNDER
SOVIET AIR DEFENSES AND THEN RESUME A BALLISTIC TRAJECTORY ON
THE WAY TO ITS TARGET. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD OUR ARGUMENTS
ABOUT BOMBER ARMAMENT AND AIR DEFENSES. NEVERTHELESS, HE
WANTED TO REMIND ROWNY THAT A LITERAL READING OF THE AIDE-
MEMOIRE DID NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN CRUISE AND BALLISTIC
MISSILES. THE SOVIET POSITION WAS CLEAR; A CRUISE MISSILE
OF OVER 600 KM. WAS INCLUDED IN THE TERM ASM.JOHNSON

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